The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule by King, John F. & Coe, Ward B., III
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 2 Spring 1974 Article 4
1974
The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule
John F. King
Anderson, Coe & King, LLP
Ward B. Coe III
Anderson, Coe & King, LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
King, John F. and Coe, Ward B. III (1974) "The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 2,
Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol3/iss2/4
THE WISDOM OF THE STRICT LOCALITY RULE
John F. Kingt and Ward B. Coe, IIIt-
Unlike the preceding article, this article favors the retention
of the strict locality rule in medical malpractice cases in
Maryland. The authors, after analyzing many of the arguments
put forth to liberalize or extinguish Maryland's version of the
strict locality rule, discuss the case history that has solidified
Maryland's position and demonstrate the justification for the
rule's continued application in this jurisdiction.
The locality rule in medical malpractice cases is today a bone of
vigorous contention. It has been much maligned by legal writers,'
abandoned by some courts,' and challenged in others.3 It is a rule of
uncertain tradition and seldom pronounced rationale. The lingering
question is whether its original justification is relevant today in light of
modern medical practice. This article will show that the locality rule
has good reasons both legally and medically for its continuing
application.
In medical malpractice suits the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff
to show that the physician did not maintain the minimum degree of
care in the diagnosis or treatment and that this failure of care
proximately caused the injury to the plaintiff. This testimony must be
elicited from experts who give their opinions as to the proper standard
of care.4 Therefore, initially, the courts must establish parameters
within which the proper standard of care may be determined. The test
applied is generally referred to as the locality rule. The rule is
established and the proper standard of care may be determined in a
jurisdiction once the court decides upon the geographical locale from
which to measure the standard.
t B.A., 1949, Dickinson College; J.D., 1953, Georgetown University Law Center; Partner,
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1. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959);
Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. L. REV. 834 (1966); Note, Medical
Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884 (1962).
2. Kronke v. Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972) (where the rule was abandoned as
to "specialists"); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968) (where local
practice within geographic proximity was reduced to being only one factor to be considered
in determining the standard of care); Naccarto v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788
(1970); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Pederson v. Dumouchel,
72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967) (where local practice within geographic proximity was
recognized as only one factor to be considered in determining the standard of care).
3. Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973).
4. There are, however, some instances when expert testimony may not be required. See note
51 infra.
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THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE RULE
There are basically three variations of the locality test presently used
in American courts. The most conservative test is the strict locality rule
from which the similar locality rule and the national standard rule have
developed.
Under the strict locality rule, in order to sufficiently demonstrate
medical malpractice the plaintiff must produce testimony that the
defendant did not adhere to the standard of care practiced by
physicians of his specialty in his own locality.' This rule was apparently
first articulated in Leighton v. Sargent6 in 1853. The court stated that a
physician who offers his services to the community contracts with his
employer that he possesses that degree of skill, learning, and experience
which is ordinarily possessed by other physicians and which is
ordinarily regarded by the community as necessary and sufficient to
qualify him to engage in such practice.7
Today, the similar locality rule is followed by a majority of the
jurisdictions in this country.' The rule states that the standard to which
physicians are held is "that degree of skill and diligence employed by
the ordinary, prudent practitioner in his field and community, or in a
similar community at the same time." 9
The leading case embracing the similar locality rule is Small v.
Howard' 0 in which a physician in a small country village allegedly
improperly treated a severe cut to the wrist. The jury charge included
an instruction that:
The defendant, undertaking to practice as a physician and
surgeon in a town of comparatively small population, was
bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons
5. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964); Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So. 2d
236 (1969); Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68 (Dist.Ct.App. 1949) (an
action for damages for an alleged technical assault arising out of an allegedly unauthorized
surgical operation); Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 102 A.2d 352 (1954); Geraty v.
Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Dunham v. Elder, 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d
568 (1973); Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941); Lockart v. Maclean, 77
Nev. 210, 361 P.2d 670 (1961); McCay v. Mitchell, 62 Tenn. App. 424, 463 S.W.2d 710
(1970).
6. 27 N.H. 460 (1853).
7. Id. at 469. As in many cases in which the locality rule has been stated, the issue did not
involve the use of the strict locality rule but, rather, whether more than ordinary care was
required of a physician.
8. See Murphy v. Dyer, 409 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1969); Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d
3 (1944); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Couch v. Hutchison, 135
So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961); Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938); Bartholo-
mew v. Butts, 232 Iowa 776, 5 N.W.2d 7 (1942); Avery v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of
Nursing, Inc., 201 Kan. 687, 442 P.2d 1013 (1968); Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171
S.E.2d 393 (1970); Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84
R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940); Hundley v.
Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
9. Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 183, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1969), cit-
ing Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 292, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940) (emphasis added).
10. 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
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of ordinary ability and skill, practicing in similar localities, with
opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily possessed; and
he was not bound to possess that high degree of art and skill
possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in large cities, and
making a specialty of the practice of surgery.' '
The defendant, practicing in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, a town of
about 2,500, maintained a general practice and performed only minor
surgery. The severity of the plaintiff's wound required a high degree of
surgical skill. An eminent surgeon resided within four miles. Although
treatment lasted ten days, the defendant did not direct the plaintiff to
visit this other surgeon. The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant to a
higher standard than the average practiced in the Commonwealth.' 2
The court relied on a contract theory in deciding that a surgeon only
represents that he possesses that skill "ordinarily possessed by others of
his profession."' '  The court emphasized that it was common
knowledge that small country village physicians were not specialists in
surgery and that the defendant here, a small-village physician, could not
be held to a standard represented by eminent surgeons in large cities.' '
Rejecting these various forms of the locality rule, several courts have
recently announced that variations in standards of medical care based
on these tests are no longer valid, thereby adopting a national test. ' 5
The rationale of the national standard cases is that with the
advancements of modern medicine, communication, and transporta-
tion, the time for judging physicians in one area differently from those
in others has passed. "The time has come when the medical profession
should no longer be Balkanized by the application of varying
geographic standards in malpractice cases."' 6
The emerging test appears to be simply whether the defendant failed
to use that care and skill generally exercised in the profession' ' or that
differing local practices become merely a factor for the jury to
consider.' 8 Some courts have approached the problem piecemeal,
indicating that with respect to certain medical procedures' or the
duty owed by a hospital to a patient,2 national standards have
11. Id. at 132.
12. Id. Again, the issue was not the application of a locality rule but, rather, whether the stand-
ard to be applied was average care or better than average care.
13. Id. at 135.
14. Id. at 136.
15. See cases cited note 2 supra.
16. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 108, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968).
17. See Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 425, 94 A.2d 680, 683 (1953).
18. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968).
19. See Couch v. Hutchison, 135 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), in which an expert from
Philadelphia was competent to testify as to the negligent performance of a laminectomy
and spinal disc fusion by a surgeon in Florida, on the basis that the defendant's perform-
ance of the operation was in a manner having national recognition and that there was no
other physician in Florida of the defendant's specialty.
20. See Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966), in which a nonlocal
expert was permitted to testify as to the cause of a staph infection contracted by an infant
in the defendant hospital and the duty of the hospital to prevent such infections.
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developed. Others have stated that, at least in urban settings, a national
standard for medical malpractice has developed.2
THE MARYLAND RULE
In 1973, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals took another look at
Maryland's application of the locality rule in Dunham v. Elder.2 2 The
court, noting the long tradition in Maryland for enforcement of the
strict locality doctrine, re-affirmed past appellate judicial pronounce-
ments as to its status in Maryland courts.
The Dunham case arose out of an incident of alleged malpractice in
Prince George's County in 1967. The defendant, a general practitioner
in Prince George's County, had diagnosed Charles Dunham as having
gout, and prescribed a drug named Benemid. The plaintiff later
developed a nephrotic syndrome, inflamation of the kidneys, and it was
thereafter discovered that he had never been afflicted with gout but was
actually suffering from arthritis. Benemid can cause nephrotic
syndrome, and, when the drug is used, periodic tests for uric acid
crystals and protein in the urine are performed to determine whether
there is any kidney effect.2 The plaintiff alleged that the doctor had
fallen below the standard of care for two reasons, namely, negligence in
the misdiagnosis of the defendant's initial complaint and negligence in
the misuse of Benemid.
The plaintiff produced two experts at trial, a urologist at George
Washington University in Washington, D.C., who had never practiced in
Maryland, and an orthopedic surgeon from New York who had been a
general practitioner in the District of Columbia from 1925 until
1928.2 4 Neither of the plaintiff's medical witnesses was allowed to
testify at trial as an expert on the standard of care employed by a
general practitioner from Prince George's County. The trial court ruled
that they lacked the requisite qualifications for testifying as to that
standard of care. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
therefore, directed a verdict for the defendant on the basis that the
plaintiff could not establish a standard of care for a general practitioner
21. Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970), where specialists from Chicago
and Los Angeles were permitted to testify as to the standard of care for pediatricians in
Detroit. The court stated:
The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and
sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he prac-
tices. Rather his knowledge is a specialty. He specializes so that he may keep
abreast. Any other standard for a specialist would negate the fundamental expecta-
tions and purpose of a specialty. The standard of care for a specialist should be that
of a reasonable specialist practicing medicine in light of present day scientific
knowledge. Therefore, geographical conditions or circumstances control neither the
standard of a specialist's care nor the competence of an expert's testimony.
Id. at 253-54, 180 N.W.2d at 791.
22. 18 Md. App. 360, 306 A.2d 568 (1973).
23. Brief for Appellant at 5.
24. 18 Md. App. at 365-66, 306 A.2d at 571-72.
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in that county in 1967, against which standard the defendant could be
measured. 2 s
In affirming, the Court of Special Appeals indicated some
dissatisfaction with the strict locality rule, but accurately interpreted
prior Maryland cases as requiring its application.2 6 The court noted
that the strict locality rule was now utilized in only a distinct minority
of the states, and that since the dissemination of medical information
had become quicker and treatment more uniform, a trend had
developed toward allowing experts from other localities to testify as to
what standard a defendant should have observed. If the issue had been
one of first impression, the court "might have been persuaded to adopt
the similar locality rule."'2  However, the court correctly recognized
that the issue was not one of first impression and reaffirmed the strict
locality rule. The opinion is a classic example of the court's proper
adherence to stare decisis. Besides the historical validity for the
Dunham decision,2  there is, more importantly, sound medical
justification for the decision, as will be demonstrated.
THE HISTORY OF THE RULE IN MARYLAND
The cases are not without exception in representing a tradition of
strict locality in Maryland, and the earliest cases display some
inconsistency. In State ex rel. Janney v. Housekeeper,2 one of the
earliest medical malpractice cases in this jurisdiction, the court stated
that it was the duty of the physician to exercise "ordinary care and
skill." 3  The following defendant's prayer was granted: "[T] he degree
of care and skill required is that reasonable degree of care and skill
which physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the treatment of
their patients . . . . " ' Apparently, the defendant requested this prayer
rather than a more restrictive locality prayer. The fact that plaintiff's
expert may have been a local Harford County physician may explain
the absence of mentioning the locality rule.
As early as 1896 in Dashiell v. Griffith,3 2 a prayer was given which
stated the locality rule in terms strikingly similar to those used by the
Dunham court:
If the jury find ... that [plaintiff's] finger was subsequently
25. Id. at 362, 306 A.2d at 570.
26. Id. at 365, 306 A.2d at 571.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 363-64, 306 A.2d at 570-71, citing Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534
(1972); Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda,
255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 (1969); Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 187
A.2d 671 (1963); State ex rel. Solomon v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962); Lane v.
Calvert, 215 Md. 457. 138 A.2d 902 (1958).
29. 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
30. Id. at 171, 16 A. at 384.
31. Id. at 172, 16 A. at 384.
32. 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896).
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amputated, and said amputation was rendered necessary by the
want of reasonable skill, care and diligence in the treatment of
said finger and of the said plaintiff, as is usually exercised by
physicians and surgeons in good standing in the defendant's
school of practice in this locality, then their verdict must be for
plaintiff.3 '
The court stated that permitting expert opinion, contrary to the
traditional rule,3" would be less objectionable if strictly construed by
inclusion of a local standard charge. Thus, by 1896, strict locality was
the recognized rule in this state.
Later cases have sometimes been misread as not being supportive of
the strict locality rule, but upon close scrutiny it is discovered that they
do not encroach upon the rule's tradition. For example, in Lane v.
Calvert,3 s which described the standard in terms of "the profession,"
locality was not at issue before the court, plaintiff's expert being from
defendant-physician's community. Also, in Johns Hopkins Hospital v.
Genda,3 6 which stated the rule in terms of "cases of this kind," 3  the
locality rule was specifically set forth in the charge to the jury.3 8
Five Maryland Court of Appeals cases,3  all recent, have cited the
strict locality rule as the standard in Maryland. The reason for the
locality rule pronouncement in these cases appears to have been to
emphasize that physicians are not required to exercise more than
ordinary care in their locality and are not to be held to have the skills
of some specialty other than their own. However, occasional lapses in
the application of the locality rule have occurred in trial courts in spite
of the rule's integrity at the appellate level.
In State ex rel. Solomon v. Fishel4 ° the appellees (defendants at
trial) argued in their brief that the case should not have gone to the jury
despite the fact that the verdict was in their favor because the plaintiff's
expert, a New York physician, was not qualified to express an opinion
33. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
34. In earlier cases the rule allowing experts to give opinions was somewhat disfavored as being
a departure from the common law tradition of testimonial knowledge. See generally 7 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1917 (3d ed. 1940).
35. 215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902 (1958).
36. 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 (1969).
37. Id. at 620, 258 A.2d at 598.
38. Record at 172.
39. State ex rel. Solomon v. Fishel, 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962), the earliest of the five
cases, stated that the question was whether or not the defendant failed to exercise the
care "generally exercised in the community (the City of Baltimore) [sic] in which he was
practicing by doctors engaged in the same field," citing Lane. Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md.
516. 276 A.2d 36 (1971) also cites and quotes from Lane as to the standard without men-
tioning locality but goes on to say that plaintiff's expert testified that defendant did not
meet the standard in the community (Montgomery County). In a case dealing with mal-
practice by an optometrist, the court stated that the standard was that "exercised gen-
erally in the community." Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156, 277 A.2d 67 (1971) (empha-
sis added), citing Fisel, Genda and Lane. See Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d
534 (1972); Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972), citing Genda.
40. 228 Md. 189, 179 A.2d 349 (1962).
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on the standard of care in Baltimore.4 The Court of Appeals found it
unnecessary to address itself to the admission of the out-of-state
expert's testimony in affirming the decision of the lower court. The
court did, however, explicitly state the strict locality rule in its opinion.
In Nolan v. Dillon,4 2 there was no locality problem. The alleged
malpractice took place in Wheaton, Maryland and the defendant
practiced in the general District of Columbia metropolitan area.4 3 One
expert practiced in Bethesda and two others in Silver Spring.
4 4
Nevertheless, the court's instruction to the jury included a classic strict
locality charge:
You are instructed that the standard of care to which the
Defendant physician is required to adhere in the practice of his
profession is only that he exercise ordinary and reasonable care
and skill in the treatment of patients, that is to say, he is not by
law required to exercise any care or skill of a special character
which exceeds that ordinarily and customarily ... employed
by physicians in the same type of practice in the community,
and therefore should you find that the Defendant doctor used
ordinary and reasonable care and did not depart from accepted
standards and practices of that field in the community . . . you
should return a verdict for the Defendant.
4 
I
The trial judge in Kruzewski v. Holz4 6 also referred, in instructions,
to the standard of care in the community, Frederick County. 4 ' The
plaintiff's expert had practiced in Florida for nineteen years and had
never practiced in Maryland,4 8 yet he was permitted, over objection, to
answer questions about the standard of care.4 Nevertheless, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Consequently, the locality
problem was moot on appeal. It is significant to note, however, that the
Court of Appeals elected to consider this matter in dicta. Therein, they
stated: "[a]t trial both sides agreed, as they should, that Dr. Holz
[defendant] was required to adhere to the same standard of care in
treating his patients as was practised by other physicians engaged in the
specialty in the community." ' ' The question of the qualification of
plaintiff's expert was not raised at the appellate level.
41. Brief for Appellant at 4, 26.
42. 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971).
43. Brief for Appellant at 3, 5.
44. Record at 53, 118, 172.
45. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
46. 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534 (1972).
47. Record at 54, 55.
48. Id. at 12, 13.
49. Id. at 13, 14. The complication in Kruszewski was that during a routine hysterectomy, the
defendant physician placed a suture through the patient's bladder, later causing a fistula
(a passage between one internal cavity and another) and leakage of urine through the
vagina. This was not recognized during the primary surgery and required multiple sub-
sequent operative procedures to correct. The plaintiff's expert was allowed to answer
questions about what was the standard required as to informing the patient of the risks of
surgery and as to recognition and correction of the complication.
50. 265 Md. at 438, 290 A.2d at 537.
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Investigation of the records and briefs in other Maryland medical
malpractice cases further reveals a faithfulness to the strict locality rule
tradition.' Thus, Maryland through the years has shown an adherence
to the strict locality rule.
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE LOCALITY RULE
In addition to the legal tradition, there are important and vital
reasons for the strict locality rule found in the medical profession itself.
Since, in Maryland, it is generally necessary to present expert testimony
as to what is the standard of care, that defendant failed to adhere to
that standard, and that such failure proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries,' 2 the effect of the locality rule is to require plaintiffs to
obtain experts who practice in the defendant's community. The strict
locality rule has been used several times since Dunham to prevent
out-of-state physicians from qualifying to testify as to the standard of
care required in the defendant's community.5 '
It has been argued that the locality rule places an undue burden on
51. In Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902 (1958), the plaintiff's expert was one of the
treating physicians. There was no reference to local standards since the expert was ob-
viously qualified in the locality. Record at 16-26.
In Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 187 A.2d 671 (1963), a local ex-
pert was asked first to assume the locality of Montgomery County in a hypothetical ques-
tion, and then was asked whether the defendant's care in diagnosing a severed tendon ad-
hered to the "accepted methods of practice in this State." Record at 28. The judge's
charge to the jury included no reference to locality, no such reference being necessary. The
standard enunciated by the judge therein was "such care as ordinarily exercised by others
in the profession generally .... Record at 52.
The trial court's instructions in Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d
595 (1969) referred to the locality (Baltimore City). The judge noted in his jury instruction
that "if you [the jury].., find.., that in so doing [referring to defendant's actions] he
failed to use that degree of care and skill possessed by ordinary skillful surgeons in this
locality under similar circumstances; then your verdict should be for the plaintiffs." Record
at 172 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 293 A.2d 253 (1972); Johns Hopkins Hosp. v.
Genda, 255 Md. 616, 258 A.2d 595 (1969).
There are a few exceptional cases in which expert testimony may not be required. See
generally Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 97-98, 288 A.2d 379, 387-88 (1972), quoting from
Central Cab Co. v. Clark, 259 Md. 542, 551-52, 270 A.2d 662, 667-68 (1970), wherein it was
noted that such a situation exists when a dentist accidentally pulls a wrong tooth, McClees
v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A.2d 124 (1930), or when a physician should amputate a wrong
limb, an obviously negligent act, Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 42 Tenn. App. 34, 298 S.W.2d
761 (1956) and Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951). The rationale for
the non-necessity of an expert witness was stated in Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 779
(Ky. 1956) wherein it was held: "There is a limitation on the rule that expert testimony is
essential to support a cause of action for malpractice where the common knowledge or
experience of laymen is extensive enough to recognize or infer negligence from the facts."
53. Royster v. Beck, C.A. No. 70-1478-N (D. Md., Oct 23, 1973); Shilkret v. Monias, Law No.
C-5479 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct., Oct. 9, 1973); Waters v. Smith, 90/43/77005
(Baltimore County Cir. Ct., Oct. 30, 1973) (mistrial upon anticipation of Dunham being
applied); Estep v. Tadalan, C-4378/63/153 (Howard County Cir. Ct., Nov. 1, 1973); Raitt
v. Montague, Law No. 37367 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct., Jan 31, 1974).
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plaintiffs for at least two reasons: (1) that there is "a conspiracy of
silence" on the part of doctors in the same community not to testify
against one another, thus forcing plaintiffs to go out of the community
in order to find a physician willing to testify;" 4 and (2) that the
locality rule may perpetuate a substandard practice simply because it is
generally accepted in the area.
Competent physicians today, however, still differ greatly as to what
they consider to be proper care and treatment of various medical
conditions, injuries, and sicknesses, just as legal experts may differ
greatly on issues of importance to the legal community.5 ' Some courts
have recognized this characteristic of the medical profession and have
held that as long as there is an honest dispute as to the proper course of
treatment, and the defendant chooses one of the disputed courses, he
cannot be held liable for a bad result therefrom.5 6 This proposition, of
course, is well established in general tort law,' and the medical
profession should not be excepted from its consistent application.
Consider the physician's dilemma upon being presented with the
following controversy over the use of Chloramphenicol in the treatment
54. Some courts have mistakenly paid lip service to the "conspiracy of silence" contention.
See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968); Christie v. Callahan,
124 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Kapuckinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.C.
1966); Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Johnson v. Winston, 68
Neb. 425, 94 N.W. 607 (1903); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953). See
generally Belli, Ready For the Plaintiff, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 408 (1957); Belli, An Ancient Ther-
apy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956).
Experience in Maryland indicates no such conspiracy exists. Numerous cases have
been presented to juries with support for the plaintiff from local physicians. See, e.g.,
Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 293 A.2d 253 (1972); Itwin v. Dorman, 1-089079-106-74
(Baltimore City Ct., May 18, 1972); Edge v. Reinhoff, 80221/93/75 (Baltimore County Cir.
Ct., May 6, 1971) (the "Bailey Goss" case).
The allegation by plaintiff's counsel of a -conspiracy of silence" is really an indication
that they have no case. Not every medical complication is the product of negligence. The
lip service paid such a contention by the courts is tantamount to holding that every red light
case should have an independent witness on each side or that there is a conspiracy going
on to defeat plaintiffs in red light cases. We have never seen a meritorious case against a
physician want for a local expert.
55. See In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), in which two prominent legal
scholars argued the opposing sides of constitutional separation of powers.
56. Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1968); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53
Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964). In Ball, the plaintiff had chronic high blood pres-
sure for which she was hospitalized for nearly six months without a successful determina-
tion of the cause. She then submitted to the performance of a translumbar aortagram by
the defendant physician, in which procedure a dye-like agent (here Urokon 70) is injected
into the aorta, permitting the taking of X-rays of the arteries to locate possible obstruc-
tions. The patient experienced immediate pain and, later, partial paralysis caused by
some of the solution escaping outside the aorta. Defendants testified that in five to ten
percent of the cases, in spite of the utmost care, some of the solution escapes, rarely
causing permanent damage. Urokon 70 was known to have a toxic effect, but was used by
about 50 percent of the physicians performing aortagrams and provided better X-rays
than less toxic agents. The court found that the defendant physician's choice of Urokon
70, combined with the fact that the procedure was only used in extreme cases where all
else failed, was not negligent.
57. W. PRossEa, TORTS 168-70 (4th ed. 1971).
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of a patient with an infection.' ' The opinions of experts vary from the
view that. the drug should never be used5 9 to the view that it can be
used quite safely.6
Assume that X, suffering from a gunshot wound to the stomach and
acute peritonitis, 6 ' an infection of the abdominal membrane enclosing
the intestines, is brought to the emergency room of a local hospital
where Chloramphenicol is used. Chloramphenicol is administered, and
the infection is controlled. Aplastic anemia, failure of the bone marrow
to manufacture blood cells, later develops, causing the death of X. X's
family then sues the treating physician presenting at trial an out-of-state
expert who testifies that the standard of care is that Chloramphenicol
has been known to have the dangerous side effect of causing aplastic
anemia and that it should not be used at all. The defendants present
testimony from local experts who contend that no causal relationship
has been established between the use of Chloramphenicol and aplastic
anemia, and that the local standard of care required the administration
of Chloramphenicol to control X's acute peritonitis. A jury of laymen
would pass judgment on this esoteric medical controversy.6 2
This example demonstrates the intolerable burden placed on the
individual physician by any rule other than strict locality. In
considering whether to administer Chloramphenicol he must consider
not only the drug itself, its possible complications, and its appropriate-
ness for the particular case, but also the effect of his acts before a jury.
If he does not use Chloramphenicol, local experts might testify against
him if the peritonitis is not controlled; if he does use the drug,
non-local experts might testify as to the drug's potential harmful
effects.
The Massachusetts case which abandoned that state's locality rule6 3
further demonstrates the physician's dilemma. There, the defendant
was delivering a baby in a hospital in New Bedford, Massachusetts in
accordance with the method used in that community.6 4 An 8 mg. dose
of spinal anesthesia, the standard dosage in New Bedford for this
58. See AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS 551 (2d ed. 1973); Bloom & Grillo, The Influence of Tetro-
cycline and Chloramphenicol on the Healing of Cutaneous Wounds, 10 J. SURG. RES. 1
(1970); Caulfield & Burke, Inhibition of Wound Healing by Chloramphenicol, 92 ARCH.
PATHOL. 119 (1971); Wallenstein, Conduit, Kasper, Brown & Morrison, Statewide Study of
Chloramphenicol Therapy and Fatal Aplastic Anemia, 208 J.A.M.A. 2045 (1969); Special
Report: Should Chloramphenicol Be Used at All?, 1 MED. J. AUST. 928 (1971).
59. Special Report, supra note 58, concludes, based on a statistical study of the increase in
occurrence of fatal aplastic anemia (failure of the bone marrow to produce blood) among
people to whom chloramphenicol had been administered, that the drug should not be pre-
scribed for the treatment of undiagnosed severe infections.
60. Bloom, supra note 58, concludes that chloramphenicol may be safely used on surgical pa-
tients without adversely affecting the healing of wounds.
61. Acute peritonitis is frequently caused by a penetrating wound to the intestine. It can be
fatal in a matter of hours.
62. For a local case involving the use of chloramphenicol, see Leonnig v. Parke, Davis, Law
No. 2759 (Calvert County Cir. Co., Jan. 21, 1972) (dismissed) (subsequently settled).
63. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
64. "Suprafundi pressure" or pressure applied to the uterus during delivery.
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method of delivery was administered. Eleven hours later, while
attempting to get out of bed the plaintiff slipped and fell as a result of
the numbness and weakness in her left leg. The testimony indicated
that the 8 mg. dose caused the leg condition which persisted for some
time thereafter.
Experts from New York and Boston testified that only 5 mg. of
anesthesia was the proper dosage and should be the standard in such a
case. The trial court, adhering to the Massachusetts same or similiar
locality rule, betrayed some disdain for it in stating that even if the
standard in New Bedford were 50% inferior to that in Boston,
nevertheless, the defendant's actions would have to be measured against
the New Bedford standard. The suggestion that the locality rule allowed
an inferior practice to continue may have been an invitation to
Massachusetts' highest court to overturn the rule. The result for the
doctor was the worst possible. If he had used 5 mg. of anesthesia, the
non-local dosage, and the plaintiff had experienced considerable pain or
other complications, local experts would have assured his liability under
the Massachusetts locality rule. Having complied with the local
standards, and existing legal doctrine, he was still found liable on the
basis of non-local or "non-similar" community testimony. The result is
that the individual doctors act at their own peril in areas of medical
controversy, leaving to the whims of juries the highly sophisticated
decision of which practice is best for the patient.
The rationale advanced for dispensing with the locality rule by the
Massachusetts court was that the rule allowed "Balkanization" of the
medical profession.6 This rationale is based on an assumption,
demonstrably false, that the medical profession does not diligently
pursue solutions to its own controversies,6 6 and that allowing juries to
decide what standard of care is applicable will somehow nationally
elevate the standards of the medical profession. Allowing non-local or
''non-similar" community testimony could just as easily have the
opposite effect. There being geographical deviations in medical practice,
the non-local or "non-similar" community testimony may in some cases
represent inferior practice. Confusion on the part of doctors as to
which standards will be applied to them, and the unfairness of exposing
them to liability whatever standard they choose, could be the only
result. That the medical profession diligently pursues its own
betterment, and that it is more competent at doing so than juries of
laymen, is unquestionable.
The strict locality rule, by no means, makes it unduly burdensome
for plaintiffs to present expert testimony in medical malpractice cases.
The "localities" to which the standards have been applied in Maryland
have always been large enough to include numerous physicians of the
65. 354 Mass. at 108, 235 N.E.2d at 798.
66. A cursory perusal of Index Medicus, the medical equivalent of the Index to Legal Periodi-
cals would be enough to dispel any thought that there are not a multitude of controversies
in many areas of medical care which are vigorously pursued throughout medical literature.
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defendant's specialty.6  The "conspiracy of silence" has not prevented
plaintiffs from obtaining local expert testimony in numerous Maryland
cases.
6 8
The argument has been made that with the great advancements in
communications and transportation, standards of medical care are
uniform throughout the country so that there is no reason for the
application of the strict locality rule.6 9 If indeed the standards are
national, there then should be no difficulty in proving that standard
through testimony from local physicians. The wisdom of the locality
rule is that where there are no such national standards, as indeed is
often the case, a physician will not be injured by being required to
make the Hobson's choice, either one of which may expose him to
liability, but only one of which would be pursuant to accepted
standards of practice in his community. The contention that National
Boards and Board Certification is evidence of a national standard is an
inappropriate application of Board Certification to standard of care.
The various specialty boards were created by the medical profession for
the purpose of advancing the standards of medical care, not for
establishing those standards. One is Board Certified for the purposes of
qualifying to set a standard. It is the physician operating in his
specialty, in his own community, who sets the standard, not the
National Boards.
There is also the danger to the consumer public that an application
of some fictitious national standard will further aggravate the cost of
medical care by the practice of defensive medicine. A few physicians
today do certain tests and carry on certain diagnostic studies not
because they really deem it essential to the best interest of the patient,
but because they deem it essential to their protection against a
potential malpractice suit.' ° If such defensive medicine is to be
67. See, e.g., Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971); State ex rel. Solomon v. Fischel,
228 Md. 189, 177 A.2d 349 (1962). Several early cases rejected the strict locality rule where
there was only one doctor in the locality. See Pelkey v. Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 67 N.W.
561 (1896); McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898); Bigney v. Fisher,
26 R.I. 402, 59 A. 72 (1904). In today's highly urbanized setting, particularly in this jurisdic-
tion, the likelihood of such a situation reoccurring is quite small.
68. See, e.g., Baulsir v. Sugar, 266 Md. 390, 293 A.2d 253 (1972); Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v.
Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 187 A.2d 671 (1963); Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902
(1958).
-69. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
70. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1974, at 20, col. 3:
Defensive medicine is the ordering by a physician of many extra, expensive X-
rays and other laboratory tests that doctors generally consider unnecessary except
for legal self-protection. The practice also includes the refusal to treat high-risk
patients.
Doctors in such sensitive specialties as orthopedics, open heart surgery, brain
surgery, neurology and plastic surgery whose work is subject to a high degree of crit-
icism are paying up to $20,000 a year for malpractice insurance [in California].
See generally HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
HEW PUBLICATION No. 73-88, ch. 2, which shows that medical malpractice claims in Mary-
land increased in 1970 by 22.8%, more than all other states except Tennessee and Cali-
fornia. See also Project: The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DUKE L.J. 939.
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proliferated by physicians being called on to adhere to some national
standard, it is not unreasonable to visualize a physician doing many
more tests and studies so that the cost of medical care becomes even
more prohibitive. The thought that medical care should be nationalized
in terms of its standards is an entirely stultifying concept. Advance-
ments in medical science occur by virtue of isolated local achievements
and studies and research. The validity of these studies is tested locally
and it is not until they have recognition in their locality that they may
later achieve adoption and a following elsewhere. In the presence of
some national standard, it is possible that such local advancements will
be discouraged for fear that to step in such a direction, away from the
national standard, would subject the physician to a claim of
malpractice. To conclude that National Boards create national
standards, which clearly is not intended by the profession, would fetter
medical practice rather than promote it.
CONCLUSION
There is adequate precedent for the Maryland courts to continue to
apply the strict locality rule as was done in Dunham which is an
exquisite example of judicial discipline. Also, besides the legal tradition,
there is overwhelming justification for the locality rule within the
medical profession. Plaintiffs have not been burdened in obtaining local
experts when local standards of care are violated. The attempt to
improve medical practices by the use of medical malpractice suits
unjustifiably assumes that the medical profession does not diligently
pursue its own improvement. Litigation is an ill-conceived substitute for
the traditional scientific methods of improving the medical profession.
Finally, the unfairness to physicians in subjecting them to possible
liability under more than one standard or requiring them to choose
among various methods of practice has a deleterious effect on the cost
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